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DENIAL OF JUSTICE. By Lloyd L. Weinreb. New York: The Free 
Press. 1977. Pp. xi, 177. $12.95 . 
.Denial of Justice is a provocative book which examines the basic 
structure of criminal investigation and prosecution in this country. 
Its author, Professor Lloyd Weinreb, finds the condition of Ameri-
can criminal justice entirely unsatisfactory. However, he does not 
simply curse the darkness of the system. Neither does he light any 
candles. Instead he suggests setting the system ablaze. After a step-
by-step analysis of the criminal process, the author, a former federal 
prosecutor, concludes that only drastic alterations of the roles of the 
police, the advocates, and the courts would make meaningful the 
pursuit of justice in this country. Since comprehensive, fundamental 
criticism is too rare in this field, Weinreb's work deserves the atten-
tion of those concerned with crime and punishment in the United 
States . 
.Denial of Justice is divided into two parts. First, the author criti-
cally examines our system of criminal justice. This section encom-
passes discussions of police investigative techniques, the prosecution 
of crimes, and guilty pleas. Second, the author proposes that the pro-
cess be replaced by a continental magisterial-inquisitorial system. 1 
THE FAIL URE OF THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCESS 
Weinreb argues that the police are inadequately trained for in-
vestigating crime and that investigating crime conflicts with their 
historical role as peacekeepers.2 The vast power of the police to ar-
rest, conduct line-ups, take physical samples and conduct interroga-
tions, is usually exercised without immediate judicial supervision. 
Yet the courts have required police to understand and weigh delicate 
constitutional questions in exercising that power.3 Weinreb contends 
1. The book contains an appendix dealing with the constitutional aspects of compelled 
governmental questioning of the defendant. This Review will not deal comprehensively with 
this or the many other constitutional concerns raised by the book. However, when appropriate, 
court rulings pertinent to specific points raised by Professor Weinreb will be noted. 
2. L. WEINREB, DENIAL OF JUSTICE 13-43 (1977) [hereinafter cited in the text by page 
number only]. There is far from complete accord on the dimensions of the peacekeeping func-
tion. See, e.g., Murphy, The Role oJ the Police in Our Modern Society, 26 REC, ASSN. B, CITY 
N.Y. 292 (1971). Former New York Police Commissioner Murphy suggests that peacekeeping 
itself is complex and demands "the exercise of discretion and decision-making of a very sensi-
tive nature." Id. at 295. 
3. See, e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 (1977); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 
(1969); Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v, 
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Draper v.,United 
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). For a graphic illustration of the dilemma which faces law enforce-
ment officers, compare Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1924), with United States v, 
Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). 
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this demand is unrealistic. The exigencies of police work-the dan-
ger, the imperatives of preserving public order-call for a police 
style incompatible with "the reflectiveness of a scholar, dispassion of 
a judge, or gentleness of a nurse" (p. 17). Asked both to maintain 
order and to investigate crimes, the police can perform neither duty 
effectively. 
The prosecution of cases fares no better, in Weinreb's view. He 
argues that much of our pretrial procedure disserves justice. Investi-
gation after arraignment is rare. For the government, the most signif-
icant evidence is the police report; for the defendant, his recollection 
of the incident. Delays before trial cause even that evidence to grow 
stale. 
Plea bargaining, Weinreb contends, produces punishments which 
do not fit the crime. He observes that neither the prosecutor nor de-
fense counsel bases his position on a detailed examination of the par-
ticular facts of the case. Rather, the prosecutor wishes to avoid costly 
trials, and the defense counsel seeks to minimize punishment-goals 
unrelated to the alleged purposes of a criminal justice system. The 
author contends that the defendant is aware throughout this process 
that he will be penalized for choosing to go to trial. 
Professor Weinreb argues that the structure of the trial, including 
jury selection, the presentation of evidence by two "sides," and the 
passive role of the judge maximize the importance of the attorneys' 
technique to the detriment of the search for truth. No disinterested 
effort is made to elucidate facts: lawyers call witnesses and ask ques-
tions in order to present only the most favorable testimony. Weinreb 
observes: "In one way or another, every aspect of the trial is dis-
torted by the presentation of evidence exclusively through the prisms 
of the prosecution and defense" (p.102). He condemns the system for 
limiting the judge to referee and the jurors to spectators. 
In sum, the author argues that the syst~m handicaps truth-seek-
ing. It relies on evidence procured chiefly by incompetent 
agents-the police-and artificially presented. To Weinreb, the the-
·ory of our adversary system bears little relation to what actually con-
fronts a person charged with a crime. 
THE PROPOSED SOLUTION 
To remedy these evils, Weinreb proposes basic changes, includ-
ing the creation of an independent arm of the judiciary with full 
investigative responsibility, so that the whole c~al process-from 
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investigation through trial-will be conducted by one agency.4 
Weinreb argues that his proposals will assure speedy adjudication 
while liberating the police to perform effectively their role as 
peacekeepers. Plea bargaining would be largely eliminated, and evi-
dence would be dispassionately presented. 
Under Weinreb's proposal, police investigations would be lim-
ited to what must be done at the scene of the crime. He urges that 
this would eliminate the schizophrenia of the present system, which 
requires the police to operate aggressively in the unpredictable world 
of crime prevention and to be disinterested investigators. Immedi-
ately after an arrest, the police would bring the suspect to an in-
<;Jependent magistrate who would conduct the investigation. 
The magistrate would have the power to summon witnesses. Be-
cause he would not be burdened with the peacekeeping and emer-
gency functions of the police, he would be better able to be neutral in 
his investigation. That investigation would include a detailed inter-
rogation of the suspect. Before questioning, the magistrate would in-
form the suspect of his right not to speak. The suspect's lawyer 
would have the right to be present, but only to suggest questions and 
help resolve ambiguities in hi& client's testimony. The lawyer could 
not advise his client, either at the interrogation or privately, to re-
main silent.5 The advantage of such a procedure, Weinreb states, is 
that the suspect is allowed to participate in and possibly influence 
the initial stages of the investigation. He argues that the present sys-
tem excludes from the investigation of the crime not only the suspect 
and his counsel, but also the prosecutor, who thus becomes unduly 
dependent on the police.6 
Following the investigation, the magistrate would determine, 
subject to appeal by the prosecutor, whether the suspect should be 
tried~ and, if so, the specific crime for which he had found sufficient 
evidence of guilt. The magistrate's record would contain all the rele-
vant evidence developed by his investigation and would replace the 
4. These suggestions seem innovative only from an American perspective; they are an ide-
alized version of the continental system. For an exhaustive discussion of one such continental 
system, see Keedy, The Preliminary Investigation of Crime in France (pts. 1-3), 88 U. PA. L. 
REV. 385, 692, 915 (1940). For a general discussion of the two systems, see Goldstein, Reflec-
tions on Two Models: Inquisitorial Themes in American Criminal Procedure, 26 STAN, L. REV, 
1009 (1974); Damaska, Evidenliary Barriers lo Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Proce-
dure: A Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506 (1973). 
5. "The roles of prosecutor and defense counsel in an investigation . . . should . . . be 
conceived ... as those of aides to the magistrate: to suggest witnesses who should be ex-
amined, indicate lines of inquiry, and see that relevant issues are not overlooked" (p. 133). 
6. See note 2 supra. Although the author recognizes that his proposal raises significant 
fifth amendment problems, he does not deal with the sixth amendment problems it also in-
volves. See generally Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Adhering to the position taken 
in note 1 supra, this Book Review will not analyze these constitutional issues. 
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pro forma police report and indictment which presently form the 
pretrial "record." Since the prosecution would be based on this rec-
ord and the defendant would have been involved in the investigation 
from the outset, adventitious factors such as legal manipulations, the 
state of a court's docket, and luck, all of which play too great a part 
in prosecutions, would be eliminated. 
Weinreb seeks to change not only the method of investigation but 
also the procedure at trial. For Weinreb, the chief problem with 
American criminal trials is that they are dominated by the prosecu-
tor and defense counsel. Under Weinreb's system, the advocates' role 
would be greatly diminished, and the jury would be replaced by a 
court composed of a judge (who would direct the presentation of 
evidence), two members of the bar, and seven lay persons. All the 
members of the court would, as a group, determine the verdict 
(p.139). 
A BRIEF CRITIQUE 
At first glance, Professor Weinreb's proposals to limit and change 
the roles of the participants in the criminal process are appealingly 
pragmatic. One must wonder, though, if this somewhat simplified 
approach to efficiency would produce the desired results. For in-
stance, would the peacekeeping function of the police be subject to 
the same judicial supervision if the investigatory functions were cen-
tered elsewhere?7 Additionally, might not limiting the investigatory 
tasks of the police lessen their sensitivity to citizens' rights? If we 
recognize the need for detached supervision of the police, we should 
be reluctant to adopt a system which would liberate police actions 
from judicial scrutiny. 8 Finally, the European experience has been 
that such a system can in fact increase the power and responsibility 
of the police to investigate crime.9 
7. Minimal judicial supervision of public agencies is fundamental to our system. The po-
lice, in their peacekeeping role, are subject to few external restraints except the exclusionary 
rule. See, e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Under Weinreb's proposed system, con-
cededly, lawsuits based on violations of constitutional rights would continue to be available. 
See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U.S. 167 (1961). 
8. For a discussion of the effect of the absence of the exclusionary rule in continental 
systems, see Goldstein & Marcus, 17ze Myth of Judicial Supervision in 17zree "Inquisitorial" 
Systems: France, Italy, and Germany, 87 YALE L.J. 240, 263-64 (1977): "Prosecutors and judges 
rely heavily on conclusory assertions in the police papers and rarely question the officers or 
call witnesses to determine whether there was a valid basis for an arrest, a search, or even a 
charge. The overwhelming presumption is that official action has been regular and lawful." 
9. Id. at 28 I. 
570 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 76:566 
As to the envisioned roles of the judges and lawyers, Weinreb's 
scorn for the adversary system is even more troubling. First, the ad-
versarial model has distinct advantages over the inquisitorial one. 
Second, it is unlikely that this reform would accomplish its goals. 
While trial lawyers do often rely upon "technique," the initiative 
and energy of advocates produce much evidence which might not 
otherwise come to view. 10 The probing and the legitimate bias of the 
litigants promotes thorough analysis of the evidence, 11 and vigorous 
cross-examination is one of the best guarantees of a complete assess-
ment of testimony. 12 A judge-directed presentation with little scope 
for the prosecutor and defense attorney may be an inadequate 
substitute. 13 
The proffered plan calls for a markedly less "passive" judge. 
Whether a jurist who is responsible for selecting and presenting evi-
dence from a magistrate's record can also disinterestedly assess the 
legal and factual issues is dubious. 14 While the current system may 
not always live up to our expectations, it may also be unrealistic to 
expect a judge to manage the combined responsibilities of juror, 
10. See ABA STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE 
FUNCTION 3 (Approved Draft, 1971): "Two adversaries, approaching the facts from entirely 
different perspectives and objectives and functioning within the framework of an orderly and 
established set of rules, will uncover more of the truth than would investigators, however in-
dustrious and objective, seeking to compose a unified picture of what had occurred," 
11. One criticism of the adversary system has been that it does not provide the best setting 
for the discovery of truth with respect to the facts of the particular case or for resolving legal 
policy. Insofar as the law-making function of the courts is concerned, it must be recognized 
that the presentation of opposing views in vigorous debate as a prelude to decision is a feature 
common to the legislative and executive as well as the jndicial process. By contention, pro-
vided it is kept within proper bounds, the area of dispute is narrowed and specious arguments 
revealed in the course of debate. Contest spurs each side to greater efforts of intellect and 
imagination, so that, in Macaulay's words, "(l]t is certain that no important consideration will 
altogether escape notice." Id. at 2-3. 
12. Id. at 3. In the Continental system, "genuinely probing trials take place only in those 
few cases in which the defendant actively contests the charges against him." Goldstein & Mar-
cus, supra note 8, at 265. 
13. See also Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference of the A.B.A, and the 
A.A.L.S. on Professional Responsibility, 44 A.B.A.J. 1159 (1958). 
14. The deciding tribunal, on the other hand, comes to the hearing uncommitted. It has 
not represented to the public that any fact can be proved, that any argument is sound, or 
that_ any particular way of stating a litigant's case is the most effective expression of its 
ments. 
The matter assumes a very different aspect when the deciding tribunal is compelled to 
take into its own hands the preparations that must precede the public hearing. rn such a 
case the tribunal cannot truly be said to come to the nearing uncommitted, for it has itself 
appointed the channels along which public inquiry is to run. If an unexp_ected tum in the 
testimony reveals a miscalculation in the design of these channels, there is no advocate to 
absorb the blame. The deciding tribunal is under a strong temptation to keep the hearing 
moving within the boundaries originally set for it. The result may be that the hearing loses 
its character as an open trial of the facts and issues, and becomes instead a ritual designed 
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expect a judge to manage the combined responsibilities of juror, 
judge and selector of evidence. Aside from the obvious constitutional 
problems inherent in such a proposal, 15 there is a genuine and 
reasonable doubt that anyone could adequately and fairly do all 
that would be required. 
It is interesting to note that judges, whom Weinreb sees as help-
less to prevent these abuses, are assigned new and crucial responsi-
bilities in Weinreb's reformed system. Developing a more committed 
and competent judiciary, which could remedy the problem of plea 
procedures and insure speedy trials, appears to be a more realistic 
goal than the radical surgery suggested by Professor Weinreb. 
CONCLUSION.· 
Professor Weinreb's proposals reflect the current widespread dis-
satisfaction with our criminal justice system. But whatever the short-
comings Weinreb identifies, his solutions tend to go beyond genuine 
criticism-they would destroy a valued and proved process of deliv-
ering criminal justice. Perhaps the greatest significance of this book 
is the fact that a serious scholar and former prosecutor was moved to 
return such a sweeping indictment. We must defend what is good 
and improve what is bad in our system; we need not damn the 
accuser . 
.Denial of Justice should be examined by those involved in or 
concerned with the American system of justice, for such examination 
requires the reader to reassess how the system operates, whom it af-
fects, and how it can be improved. A book which can provoke such 
thoughts is worthy of notice. 
Joel M. Flaum 
United States .District Judge 
Northern .District of Illinois 
to provide public confirmation for what the tribunal considers it has already established 
in private. 
Id. at 1161. 
15. One aspect of the constitutional separation of powers is "that the courts are not to 
interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary powers" of government attorneys. United 
States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Cox v. Hanberg, 381 U.S. 935 
(1965). See also Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 454, 457 (1868). 
